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Introduction 
After a period of relative stagnation, in recent years the construction of hydropower dams has 
experienced an unprecedented global boom in both scale and extent [1]. The global hydropower 
installed capacity has grown by 39% in the period 2005-2015, with an average growth rate of about 
4% per year (World Energy Council Database, URL: 
https://www.worldenergy.org/data/resources/resource/hydropower/). Zarfl et al. [1] estimate that 
40% of the total future electricity capacity addiction from hydropower will be installed in low and 
middle income countries.    
Until the early 2000s, the World Bank was the largest financier of large-scale hydropower 
development in low and middle income countries. However, due to the massive social and 
environmental impacts associated with large dam constructions [2] and the increasing public 
contestations [3**], the sector went into a lull during the 1990s and many projects were dropped. 
After 2000, Chinese companies and banks became global leaders in large hydropower dam 
development, especially thanks to a series of Chinese internationalization policies, of which the most 
relevant are the 2000 “Going-Out” strategy and the 2013 “Belt and Road Initiative” [4]. The driving 
forces behind this were equally economic and political [5]. 
These strategies encouraged Chinese State-Owned Banks (SOBs) and Enterprises (SOEs), as well as 
private enterprises, to engage in new investments in infrastructure development abroad with the 
authorization and financial support of the central government [6**]. According to the most updated 
database available on Chinese overseas engagement in hydropower (last updated in September 
2017), 96% of Chinese overseas hydropower projects have been built and planned after 2000 [4]. 
Some of these large dam projects have been questioned in the literature mainly regarding social-
ecological changes, transboundary and governance issues, and in relation to environmental justice 
and ecological distributional aspects [7, 8,9,10*,11*,12*,13**, 14, 15**, 16**].  
In this paper we set out to explore the drivers and conflictive outcomes linked to the social-
environmental governance and management challenges of Chinese large dam constructions in the 
global South. We reflect on the body of literature published in recent years on Chinese dam 
developers’ engagement overseas and on Chinese dam projects located in different regions of the 
world by using information from the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (EJAtlas Database, URL: 
https://ejatlas.org/). 
“Push” and “pull” factors of Chinese overseas dam-building in the global South  
With an estimated 380 large dam projects in more than 70 countries worldwide either built, under 
construction or planned, Chinese companies and banks are today the biggest hydropower builders 
and financiers at the global level [4]. Most of the Chinese overseas large dams have been built or 
planned in the period 2006-2017, and they are located in developing countries in South and 
Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America (Table 1). With about 40% of the whole projects, Southeast 
Asia represents the preferential geographical localization of Chinese hydropower development for 
obvious reasons of geographic proximity, physiographic conditions of rivers, close political and 
economic relationships and cultural similarities [4].   
Table 1 Estimated hydropower capacity and percentage of Chinese overseas hydropower projects 
(built, planned and under construction) by region, 2006-2017 [4] 
Region Estimation of total hydropower 
capacity (MW) 
Estimated number of 
hydropower projects (%) 
Asia (SE) 63444 41 
Asia (S) 26822 10 
Africa 21210 25 
Latin America 9631 10 
Europe 5984 10 
Asia (Central) 2151 3 
Middle East 558 1 
Oceania 180 0 
Pacific 59 1 
 
As China has become the leading actor in dam-building in the global South, there have been 
increasing interests from academia and international organizations to look at the motives of Chinese 
State Owned Banks (SOBs) and Enterprises (SOEs). Based on the literature on Chinese overseas 
engagement in hydropower development, in Table 2 we distinguish between “push” and “pull” 
factors of Chinese overseas dam-building, differentiating between diversified drivers and motives 
that “push” Chinese banks and hydropower companies to invest abroad and “pull” factors as the 
motives of the host governments to welcome Chinese hydropower investments. 
Table 2 Push and pull factors of Chinese overseas investments in hydropower 
Drivers Push factors (Chinese investors and financiers)  Pull Factors (host countries) 
Political  Going Out Strategy (1.0 and 2.0) 
 Belt and Road Initiative  
 Improve energy access and energy security 
 Development and economic growth 
 “No strings attached” 
Economic  Access to new hydropower markets for 
hydropower companies 
 Access to cheap loans for hydropower 
companies 
 Bundling of aid, trade and investments 
 Access to finance  
 Low costs and reduction of overrun costs 
 Bundling of aid-trade and investments 
 Industrial development 
Geopolitical  Access to natural resources (water, 
minerals, fossil fuels) 
 Geographical proximity, political 
relationships and cultural similarities 
 Climate change mitigation 
 Investment in low carbon energy 
 Establish new international geopolitical 
alliances (esp. for Latin America) 
 Hydropower imports 
Reputational  Help countries from the Global South to 
develop 
 Desire to become the biggest dam-
building player at the global level 
 Icons of modernity 
 International agreements on Climate Change – 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects 
 
Emerging in 1999 the Going Out Strategy of China coincided with China’s 2001 admission to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and urged Chinese firms to take advantage of the world trade by 
investing in global markets. Also the “Belt and Road Initiative” established in 2013 aimed to expand 
Chinese trade and investments including investments in hydropower along the land-based “Silk-
Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and the sea-based “Maritime Silk Road” (MRS). This initiative takes 
advantage of international transport routes as well as core cities and key ports to build six 
international economic co-operation corridors and further strengthens bilateral and multilateral 
economic agreements between China and other nations. Iit supports Chinese investments in 
hydropower across Central Asia and along the maritime route from the South China Sea to the 
Indian Ocean, East Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean [17, 18*].  
These strategies have different aims: economic, reputational and geopolitical. From a reputational 
point of view they have the ambition to set China as a global leader in international cooperation by 
helping low and middle income countries to develop through the provision of infrastructures mainly 
in mobility (i.e. road, railway, port construction), energy, and agricultural sectors [17, 5, 19]. From an 
economic point of view they have the intention to push Chinese firms to seek for new market 
opportunities abroad, especially for oversaturated national markets with high domestic expertise 
and stiff competition, such as the hydropower sector [20, 15**]. The expansion of Chinese 
hydropower firms aboard is highly supported by the lack of many international competitors and 
copious state funding, particularly through preferential loans from Chinese state-owned banks, and 
well-funded financial institutions such as Exim Bank of China [6**] and more recently the Silk Road 
Fund and potentially from the new multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). Many of the Chinese hydropower companies are SOEs and often business 
decisions are influenced, initiated and guaranteed by the Chinese Government regardless of 
whether they bring positive returns [15**]. At the same time, the peculiarity of Chinese overseas 
dam-building is the bundling of aid, trade and investments [20]. For example, Chinese overseas 
investments in hydropower can be a package rather than a separate initiative, which comprises not 
only investments in the construction of the dam but also in different infrastructures and economic 
sectors, concessional loans, as well as trade agreements all together [20, 18*]. The bundling of aid, 
trade and investments of Chinese hydropower is sometimes linked to geopolitical drivers, 
particularly the seeking for new trade agreements to access natural resources, such as energy, food, 
water and minerals [18*, 22, 23, 24, 25] (EJAtlas Database, URL: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/hatgyi-
dam-myanmar; EJAtlas Database, URL: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/myitsone-dam-on-irrawaddy-
river-myanmar).  Another peculiarity of Chinese investments overseas is the “no-string attached” 
policy, which means that they tend to pursue a non-interference policy with little, if any, political 
preconditions for the host countries [26; 15]. This attitude to business relations differs from the 
conditions imposed by Western countries, or other international aid organizations, such as the 
World Bank or International Monetary Fund, which prescribe a number of conditions to be met, 
including specific environmental and political conditions (e.g. human rights, democracy, and 
international labor standards) [27]. 
Comparatively low costs, reduction of overrun costs, technical capacity, access to large finance with 
low or no-conditionality attached and on occasion cheap loans in a time when other OECD investors 
decided to opt out of large hydropower dam construction, make Chinese investors attractive 
partners for low and middle income countries that are struggling with electricity access and energy 
security and most importantly that have low capital and technical capacity to invest in big 
infrastructure projects (Table 2) [15**, 21*, 28].  Hydropower dams also represent an opportunity 
for developed countries to invest in climate change mitigation strategies in low and middle income 
countries through the United Nations’ carbon-offsetting scheme Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and more recently also through the Green Climate Fund  [29]. Despite the high number of 
large hydro projects in the CDM pipeline, climate neutrality of large hydropower dams and 
reservoirs is questioned by some scholars [30, 31]. Some scholars and activists argue that it should 
not be included in climate mitigation programs such as the CDM [32, 33]. Key contentious issues are 
methane emissions caused by submerged organic matter in stagnant water of reservoirs, particularly 
in the tropics [34, 35]. Yet, some countries depend almost entirely on hydropower for their 
electricity generation such as Nepal and Mozambique, and any large-scale alternatives would most 
likely be fossil fuel-based. From a reputational point of view, large dams are also considered 
“powerful icons of modernity, economic success, national prestige and technological progress” [36], 
especially in low and middle income countries.  
Environmental justice and conflictive aspects of Chinese overseas dam projects  
Studies on environmental justice in large hydropower dam development is today a growing research 
field [28, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 3**, 50, 64]. Moreover, growing investment into large hydropower dams 
in the global South has been associated with the rise of ecological distribution conflicts and violence 
[3**]. Such conflicts arise over environmental injustices caused by the way how environmental 
benefits and burdens from large dams are distributed across different social groups, as well as over 
procedural issues, i.e., how institutions and power relations shape the decision-making process [42, 
43, 16**].  
Environmental justice can broadly be divided into distributive justice and procedural justice [65, 66*, 
67]. Distributive justice relates to the fair distribution of basic needs such as adequate access to food 
and water, housing, income and employment, basic services like healthcare as well as an equitable 
distribution of environmental ‘bads’ and ‘goods’. Procedural justice relates to fair, accountable and 
transparent decision-making in relation to the environment [66*, 67]. Schlosberg argues that in 
addition, issues of recognition, capabilities and participation need to be addressed to achieve 
environmental justice [66*]. In recent years, the concept of energy justice has gained more 
prominence, which refers to the fair and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of energy 
services (hence distributive energy justice), as well as fair, accountable and transparent energy 
decision-making (hence procedural energy justice) [68, 69]. In this line of reasoning, Moran et al 
(2018) argue that the hydropower industry needs to focus more on addressing the adverse social 
and environmental impacts of large dams and they suggest that more sustainable practices need to 
be adopted [72]. 
Overseas Chinese investments attracted special attention in the literature for the novelty of its 
actors and dynamics, as well as its size, speed of investment and global coverage [15**]. In Table 3 
we provide an analysis of the main controversial aspects of hydropower investments that have 
resulted or may result in environmental justice concerns and conflicts between dam-builders, host 
governments, and local communities.  
Table 3 Conflictive dimensions and aspects of hydropower investments in the global-South 
Dimension Key conflictive aspects 
Geography and responsibility  Siting (environmental and social risks) 
 Rural-urban relations 
 Transboundary issues 
 Impacts on vulnerable groups (e.g. Indigenous Peoples) 
 
Resource access  Enclosures 
 Distribution 
 Appropriation 
Governance and power relations  Accountability 
 Transparency and procedural justice 
 Inclusiveness 
 Social-Environmental Impact Assessment (ESIA) 
 Social safeguards measures 
 Monitoring and mitigation of the impacts 
 Unbalanced power relations 
 Unclear responsibilities 
Technology transfer  Transfer of expertise, skills and knowledge 
 Employment 
Culture and identity  Livelihoods 
 Social cohesion 
 Recognition of different worldviews 
 Historical tensions 
 
Geography, responsibility and resource access 
The spatial dimension of energy provision, both in terms of localization of extraction and energy 
distribution, poses environmental justice concerns [45]. Decisions over the localization of large dams 
should assure the minimization of the socio-environmental impacts (procedural justice principle) and 
the equal distribution of benefits between populations in different geographical areas (distributional 
justice principle) [43], for instance, between urban and rural dwellers [44**].  
 
The siting of large hydropower dam projects in ecologically and socially sensitive zones, such as 
protected areas and biodiversity hotspots, or land under Indigenous customary rights, is a central 
conflictive aspect identified in the literature of large dams investments in the global South. For 
instance, the Bakun dam in Malaysia, built in a biodiversity hotspot in Borneo following the 
resettlement of ca. 10,000 indigenous, has been a source of ongoing disagreements between the 
State, Indigenous Peoples and NGOs [46, 47*, 48*] (EJAtlas Database, URL: 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/malaysia ). Yet it also needs to be acknowledged that the role of Chinese 
firms and financiers was limited due to extensive Malaysian development in the Bakun dam building 
process. Also, the hydropower developments of some OECD dam-builders are reported to have 
resulted in equally questionable procedures, practices and impacts, such as Salini Impregilo’s Gibe III 
dam in Ethiopia [70, 71]. 
Concerning the fair distribution of benefits, the reduction of energy poverty, especially in rural areas, 
is one of the main justifications of large dam construction in low and middle income countries. In 
some countries large hydropower projects in the global South make vital contributions to energy 
access for rural communities [49*, 50*]. On the flip side, there are several cases where the 
electricity produced is not used to close the rural electricity gap, but instead electricity is exported, 
or used for urban development, industrial and mining productions [51*, 46]. This aspect provokes 
distributional justice concerns, as for example for the Chinese planned Naung Pha dam in Myanmar, 
in which 90% of the produced electricity is planned to be exported to China, despite the 
government’s claim to address Myanmar’s growing energy needs. Social mobilizations against the 
dam plans have therefore arisen (EJAtlas Database, URL: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/naung-pha-
dam-on-the-salween-river-shan-state-myanmarEjatlas).  
Large hydropower dams in the global South may furthermore raise transboundary concerns and 
conflicts for the use of water resources between neighboring countries, as has been observed in the 
Mekong Basin [18*, 52]. In Vietnam for instance China’s dam building activity upstream of the 
Mekong is perceived as potentially undermining national development due to water access security 
reasons, leading to political tensions between the two countries [11*]. Reduced access to land for 
agriculture and poor fertility of land has also been one of the main concerns of resettled 
communities from several foreign-built hydropower projects located in Africa and Asia, as indicated 
in the cases analyses in Siciliano et al., 2018b. Resource access by Chinese investors through multi-
purpose investments linked to large dam projects have also been analyzed in the literature and 
reported in the media, such as trade agreements for mining resources access in the Amazon 
associated to the São Luiz de Tapajós hydropower plant [23], cocoa production in Ghana associated 
to Bui dam [22] and access to oil resources in Ecuador associated to Coca-Codo Sinclair dam [24]. 
Governance and power relations 
Accountability, transparency, participation and informed consent of those affected by energy 
projects is at the basis of justice principles in energy decision-making [43]. Moreover, restoration of 
the negative socio-environmental impacts is considered fundamental to ensure energy justice [53]. 
For dam construction this is pursued for instance with the implementation of Social-Environmental 
Impact Assessments (ESIA), resettlement planning frameworks,  social safeguards measures, post-
acceptance monitoring and mitigation of the impacts, as well as inclusiveness of the entire decision-
making process [2].  
 
For large dams in the global South, responsibility for the implementation of such safeguards 
mechanisms is regulated by the host countries legislations. This is particularly the case with Chinese 
investments [8] for which environmental and political preconditions are rarely attached, as 
discussed previously. Nevertheless, the literature discusses varying degrees of responsibility of 
Chinese builders and financiers depending on the types of contract, i.e. Build, Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) and Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts.  Under EPC contracts 
(turnkey contracts), the builders are responsible for the construction of the dam while the host 
countries take the responsibility of carrying out the preliminary studies including the EIA, provide the 
technical, legal and other guarantees, handling resettlement and compensation processes, monitor 
implementation, and operate the dams. Under BOT arrangements, the dam-building company 
provides technical capacity for construction and operation and maintenance in exchange of 
operating rights for a period of typically 20-40 years [54*]. The company then later hands back the 
ownership of the dam to the host government.  
 
According to a study by International Rivers on the implementation practices, and environmental 
and social commitments of seven major Chinese overseas hydropower companies, EPC Contractors 
outperform BOT Contractors in both policy and project assessments. Among the mentioned reasons 
is that EPC contracts require less long-term involvement than BOT contracts in terms of 
environmental and social safeguards. This highlights the challenges for the implementation of 
international, Chinese and national host country laws and standards when enforcement of 
regulations in the host countries is weak [54*, 13**].  
 
An example is the case of the Kamchay dam in Cambodia, where law enforcement is weak [6**, 8]. 
The construction of the dam commenced in 2007, however the EIA was not completed until 2012. 
Justice concerns were voiced over the poor participation of affected communities, irregularities in 
the compensation schemes, and lacking implementation of environmental safeguards and mitigation 
measures [51*, 55*]. In other cases under EPC contracts, such as the Bui dam in Ghana and Bakun 
dam in Malaysia, international standards for the preparation of the EIA were accomplished, but 
opposition and complaints from resettled communities arose over poor participation, location, size 
and quality of the resettlement area, land scarcity, lack of proofs of house ownership, lack of 
employment alternatives, or lack of security services to prevent increasing crimes in the 
resettlement areas [12*, 48*].  
Technology transfer 
Urban et al. [56*] found that in the case of BOT contracts, which requires longer-term involvement 
of Chinese dam-builders in the host countries, despite the transfer of technology (hardware), the 
transfer of skills and know-how for operation and maintenance and the knowledge and expertise for 
innovation in hydropower may often be limited, particularly for dam construction based on BOT 
contracts in countries with limited experience in the hydropower sector. This aspect can raise 
concerns from local workers as contracts tend to be often for short-term and low-skilled 
employments, such as in the case of Kamchay dam in Cambodia. More technical training of staff, job 
placements and joint ventures could help to build up the technical capacity of the recipient country. 
Culture and Identity 
The recognition of different values and worldviews in society is fundamental to achieve social 
cohesion and to assure that energy decisions respond to principles of procedural justice [43]. Del 
Bene et al [3**] argue that protests against dams are frequently attempts of affected groups to 
protect their own ways of life and cultural understandings of sustainable resource uses. According to 
Hensengerth [57**] the potential lacking engagement of Chinese companies with local communities 
and the poor recognition of their different values is likely to further exacerbate conflicts, while 
causing identity fragmentations and cultural losses. 
 
A recent study on large hydropower dam in the Greater Mekong Region, for example, has shown 
that dam programs commonly tend to ignore different cultures and identities of affected 
populations, leading to value fragmentation and regional conflicts and tensions [57**].  For instance, 
the Lower Sesan 2 dam in Cambodia has provoked conflicts because the rights and tradition of 
Indigenous communities were largely ignored, including their spiritual attachments to the river 
[57**]. Also, the Upper Yeywa dam in Myanmar, currently under construction by Chinese companies, 
has become very controversial because it would flood important cultural sites and hundred years old 
stupas (EJAtlas Database, URL: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/upper-yeywa-dam-on-the-namtu-river-
shan-state-myanmar).  Latin American literature also stressed the nature of conflicts as defense of 
one’s territory against the expansion of the “extractivist frontier” and its local cultural impacts [58, 
59]. Chinese capital is advancing very fast in a number of megaprojects in Latin America, including 
energy infrastructures, at least since 2008 [60], often justified as green financing of development 
and integration of the region [61]. The Cola Codo Sinclair project in Ecuador, Cachuela Esperanza on 
the River Beni in Bolivia [61], and the large scale hydroelectric exploitation of the Patuca River in 
Honduras [62] are examples of the first Chinese dam-developers’ engagement in the region which 
have resulted in contestations from local groups due to the loss of cultural diversity. Chinese dam 
construction was also found to exacerbate historical tensions because of its development in 
culturally fragile zones in Asia [65]. Examples are the development of Myanmar’s Salween dams in 
areas of ethnic conflict, such as the Hatgyi dam in Karen state (EJAtlas Database, URL: 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/hatgyi-dam-myanmar), or the Kunlong dam in Shan State (EJAtlas 
Database, URL: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/kun-long-dam-on-the-salween-river-myanmar ). 
Concerns were voiced they could trigger reoccurrences of armed conflict and threaten a fragile 
peace process between ethnic armed groups and the Myanmar Army [63*].  
 
Conclusion 
Chinese large dam builders and financiers dominate the international large hydropower industry in 
terms of size, speed of investment and global coverage. There is the potential for Chinese large 
hydropower dam development to provide energy access to poor countries. Still nearly 20 years after 
the World Commission on Dams’ report has been published, which openly condemned the negative 
implications of large dams on local populations and the environment, environmental justice 
concerns and conflicts associated with large dams remain unsolved problems in the global South. 
The way Chinese actors engage with the host governments and local populations, such as the “no-
string attached” policy, bundling of aid, trade and investments, limited responsibility and 
engagement with the local socio-environmental context, and dam-building in ecologically and 
culturally fragile zones, has raised a vivid debate in academia, in the media, as well as within civil 
society organizations. While research on the implications of Chinese large hydropower dam 
development in Asia and Africa is advancing, there is far too little research which looks at 
environmental justice and other geographical areas, such as for instance Latin America. This paper 
aims to make a valuable contribution for opening up debates and future research on environmental 
justice and contested aspects of Chinese and non-Chinese large hydropower expansion in the global 
South.    
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